Restoring Bicameralism in Belgium

By yjeaEuropean Public Policy

Photo: Marius Badstuber | Unsplash

Guest Author: Stephen Chilimidos

Stephen is a policy fellow at the European Nations and Regions Organisation in Vienna. A recent graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles, he focuses on comparative politics and innovation programs. In this article, he addresses the decline of the senate as a meaningful legislative body in Belgium, while advocating for strengthening its powers to improve national unity and governance.

Introduction

Belgium is one of the most decentralized federal systems in the world. This structure developed gradually over the past half century in response to deep historical, cultural, and linguistic divisions. Rather than forge a singular national identity, Belgium’s political architecture has sought to preserve coexistence through power-sharing and regional autonomy [i]. As a result, Belgian federalism requires careful institutional balancing between multilingualism, multiculturalism, and regionalism. One of the key instruments once intended to reflect this balance was the senate, envisioned as a chamber representing the federated entities within federal decision-making. Yet, in recent decades, particularly after constitutional reform in 2014, the senate has been stripped of most of its legislative functions. This paper revisits the implications of that reform and argues that restoring a functionally meaningful and territorially representative upper chamber is necessary to strengthen the federal system.

State of Affairs

Belgium’s federal legislative system is defined by Articles 36 to 78 of its Constitution. It involves the King, the lower body Chamber of Representatives, and the upper body senate. Since the Sixth State Reform of 2014, the Chamber of Representatives has become the primary legislative body, while the Senate’s role has been significantly reduced [ii]. Senators were no longer directly elected, reduced in composition, and is officially a “non-permanent body”. Similarly, the senate has been continuously stripped of legislative influence in past state reforms. With the establishment of a federal state in 1993 (4th state reform), the senate lost its powers to trigger votes of confidence and was curbed in influence regarding specific legislation areas [iii]. There are three main legislative procedures:

  1. Monocameral Procedures (Article 74): Most legislation, such as the federal budget, tax laws, and social or economic policy is passed exclusively by the Chamber of Representatives. The senate has no role in any of the processes.
  2. Bicameral Procedures (Article 77): This applies to laws concerning constitutional amendments, institutional reforms, international treaties, and cooperation between the federal state and regions or communities. Both chambers must approve identical versions of these laws.
  3. Optional Bicameral Procedures (Article 78): For other federal legislation that affects regions and communities, such as cross-regional infrastructure, the Chamber initiates the process. The Senate may request a second reading and propose amendments. The Chamber holds the final decision [iv].

Regarding composition, the chamber of representatives is directly elected using proportional representation within electoral districts drawn on linguistic boundaries. It has 150 members serving five-year terms.

The senate has 60 members. 50 are appointed by community and regional parliaments, while 10 are co-opted. Senators serve five-year terms concurrent with regional legislatures. The senate allows for the representation of the small German speaking minority of Ostbelgien, with one senator. Similarly, the Brussels capital region requires one Dutch and one French speaking senator to be appointed [v].

Critiques of the Existing Senate

Political actors and scholars have questioned the relevance of maintaining the chamber. A central argument is that decentralization has rendered a federal upper house redundant. In a system where regions and communities already possess their own directly elected parliaments; with sweeping authority over education, culture, health care, and local economic policy, the logic of duplicating that territorial representation in a federal chamber is increasingly seen as unnecessary [vi]. These entities can already legislate independently within their own spheres, rendering the senate’s inter-community coordination function arguably obsolete.

From a political standpoint, the Senate is frequently regarded as an institution marked by inefficiency and partisanship, functioning more as an extension of the lower chamber’s party structures than as an independent, deliberative body. Since senators are appointed by party-dominated regional parliaments, the Senate often reflects the same party coalitions as the Chamber. Party politics is strong in Belgium, and a stronger senate risks reinforcing polarization rather than serving as a neutral mediator [vii].

Financial critiques also resonate among some areas of society. The Senate is estimated to cost around €40 million annually, a small fraction of the federal budget, but a frequent target of Flemish nationalist parties who have called for its abolition on efficiency grounds [viii]. Their argument is simple: in an era of overlapping institutions and high public debt, the state should not fund a chamber with little influence [ix].

From a political standpoint, the Senate is frequently regarded as an institution marked by inefficiency and partisanship, functioning more as an extension of the lower chamber’s party structures than as an independent, deliberative body.

Refutations & Importance of Senate Reform

Critics of bicameralism argue that strengthening the Belgian Senate would aggravate partisan polarization in an already fragmented political landscape. Yet this concern overlooks the institutional vacuum left by the senate’s current symbolic role and the consequences of increasing legislative centralization. In practice, the erosion of bicameralism has not led to more efficient governance, but to a concentration of power in the executive, and a breakdown of coordination between federated entities.

The Sixth State Reform, driven by the assumption that the senate had become redundant in a decentralized federal structure, significantly curtailed its legislative role. This has weakened federal checks and exacerbated imbalances in how regions and communities are represented in federal decision-making. While subnational autonomy has grown, there has been no proportional expansion of institutional mechanisms for cooperation and coordination. The Chamber of Representatives has limited incentive to build consensus with smaller communities or less populous regions. The German-speaking community of Ostbelgien, already absent from the lower chamber, would lose all parliamentary presence at the federal level if the senate were abolished. Likewise, Brussels’ representation would be elected through separate linguistic blocs, rather than the senatorial designation of unique territorial and equal linguistic character.

In practice, the erosion of bicameralism has not led to more efficient governance, but to a concentration of power in the executive

Moreover, Belgium has drifted toward executive-dominated governance. As of 2025, roughly 80% of federal legislation originated from the Prime Minister’s executive cabinet rather than parliamentary initiative [x]. In such systems, parliaments become reactive rather than deliberative, with the legislature functioning largely to ratify government decisions. Belgium’s hollowed-out senate has thus contributed to a similar dynamic, in which the lower chamber operates as a rubber stamp and the senate takes little initiative in setting their own agenda.

A structurally reformed and politically empowered senate could counteract this trend by serving as a forum for territorial deliberation, offering federated entities a meaningful voice in federal policymaking. The senate is a crucial embodiment of the polis: a chamber of the regions, where territorial units deliberate as political actors. As Popelier argues, this kind of upper chamber is not redundant but essential in a federal system where regions are constitutionally autonomous yet politically marginalized in federal-level lawmaking, even if equal competencies are not given to both chambers [xi].

The senate already nominates one-third of the Federal Advisory Committee on European Affairs, but its limited authority means that influence over European decision-making remains largely informal. This is increasingly problematic. In many cases, EU directives directly affect regional and community competences such as education, environment, and employment.

Comparative federal models underscore the value of bicameralism when the second chamber is tied to territorial representation. Germany’s Bundesrat allows Länder to appoint delegations that vote “en bloc”, turning intergovernmental negotiation into a legislative norm [xii]. Austria’s Bundesrat must approve legislation that affects Länder competences, particularly when EU directives impact federal division of powers [xiii]. The senate would not duplicate the lower chamber’s work but would focus on legislation that transcends jurisdictional boundaries. These range from federal budget allocations, public health coordination, trans-regional infrastructure, EU transposition measures, and constitutional reform. Similarly, these competencies would ensure closer scrutiny of proposed lower chamber legislation if optional bicameral procedures were codified into official bicameral procedurals.

These are precisely the areas where regional interests intersect and where current federal lawmaking lacks institutional balance. Even within a decentralized federation, the need for a venue of horizontal coordination remains acute.

Belgium could follow this model by clearly separating the senate’s electoral logic from that of the Chamber of Representatives. The senate could feature staggered terms so that, for example, only some percentage of both chambers are renewed at a time. Elections could be held independently from the lower chamber to avoid concurrent political cycles and reduce national party dominance. Senators could be chosen from territorially based districts aligned with the federated regions and communities, using open-list proportional representation.

Conclusion

Belgian federalism emerged not from a project of national unity, but as a compromise to manage deep linguistic and regional cleavages. Its layered, asymmetric structure diffuses power across communities and regions rather than concentrating it in a central state. While this model has helped avoid open conflict, it has also entrenched institutional fragmentation, reinforced separate societal spheres, and weakened national cohesion. Today, Belgium faces the challenge of maintaining regional autonomy while ensuring that the federal system remains representative and united in national vision. The restoration of a stronger bicameral legislature ensures mechanisms for minority representation, better political participation, and keeps the extensive decentralized framework for federated entities.

References

  1. Adams, Maurice (2014). Disabling constitutionalism. Can the politics of the Belgian Constitution be explained?, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 12, Issue 2, April 2014, Pages 279–302, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou028
  2. Berhoumi, Mathias El (2025). “Toward a Unicameral Federalism in Belgium?” ConstitutionNet.
  3. Ibid.
  4. The Belgian Constitution (English Translation) March 2021, www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/constitution/GrondwetUK.pdf.
  5. “The Federal Parliament.” The Federal Parliament | Belgium.Be, www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/government/federal_authorities/federal_parliament.
  6. Goossens, Jurgen, and Pieter Cannoot (2015). “Belgian Federalism after the Sixth State Reform.” PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM 7 (2): 29–55. https://doi.org/10.1515/pof-2015-0009 .
  7. Van Wynsberghe, Caroline (2014). “The Belgian Senate: Little Damage, Little Use.” Verfassungsblog, Verfassungsblog, 23 Mar. 2016, verfassungsblog.de/belgian-senate-little-damage-little-use-2/.
  8. “Prime Minister Hopes to Move Quickly to Abolish Senate: VRT NWS: News.” VRTNWS, VRT NWS, 15 May 2025, www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/2025/05/15/abolition-senate-de-wever-talks/.
  9. “‘The Senate Continues to Waste Money.’” Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), 7 Dec. 2022, english.n-va.be/news/the-senate-continues-to-waste-money.
  10. OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025: Belgium | OECD, www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/04/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2025_a754bf4c/full-report/belgium_e36cdb55.html.
  11. Popelier, Patricia (2018). Bicameralism in Belgium: The Dismantlement of the Senate for the Sake of Multinational Confederalism, Perspectives on Federalism, webarchive-2009-2021.on-federalism.eu/attachments/302_download.pdf.
  12. “Responsibilities.” Bundesrat, www.bundesrat.de/EN/funktionen-en/aufgaben-en/aufgaben-en-node.html. Accessed 21 July 2025.
  13. “Participation in EU Matters.” Parliament Austria. www.parlament.gv.at/en/eu-international/european-union/participation-nc-fc/participation-in-eu-matters/#:~:text=Co%2Ddetermination%20and%20Participation%20Regarding,range%20of%20opportunities%20to%20participate.