Guest Author: Costanza Galetto
Costanza Galetto is a Master’s student in European Affairs at the Sciences Po, Paris. Enrolled in the “Europe in the World ” policy stream, she explores various topics related to European and International Affairs. She is particularly interested in subjects related to crises and crisis management by governments in the EU, such as the role of politics in narrating and constructing crises. She holds a deep interest in environmental sustainability and climate policies. In the past, she worked on topics related to the climate and the energy crisis and the European Green Deal.
Introduction
In 2015, United Nations Member States adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, committing to implement the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that are at its core. While the environmental aspect represents only one of the three integrated dimensions of development addressed by the SDGs – alongside the economic and social ones – available evidence suggests the existence of significant positive correlations between tackling climate change and accomplishing all SDGs. More specifically, synergies have been identified between climate action and 80% of the targets of the Agenda.[1] Thus, the path to sustainable development seems to be largely dependent on the capability of national governments to attain the global climate goal of limiting global warming to two degrees above pre-industrial levels and to avert the worst-case scenarios for the planet in terms of climate change.
States appear, however, to be ‘too small to deal with the global problems of modernity’ alone.[2] Evidently, being ‘global risks’ whose causes and consequences extend far beyond borders or time horizons, [3] environmental issues require both domestic and international politics to be successfully addressed. For these reasons, a multi-level environmental governance approach – where strong national strategies are coupled with increased cooperation among different actors within and across states as well as transnational policies – stands out as the most appropriate way to deal with such complex multi-dimensionality.
As far as the current national climate plans are concerned, available research shows that they remain insufficient, and that the commitments of national governments fall short of what is required to attain the goals set in major climate international treaties.[4] Global governance on environmental issues faces several limitations as well. As Fraundorfer has pointed out,[5] international cooperation on environmental matters is hindered by the prevalence of Westphalian principles of national sovereignty and national economic interests that trump ecological concerns. According to Falkner,[6] some of the key challenges of global environmental governance are the disparities in how climate change affects countries, the difficulties associated with predicting the behaviour of other emitters, and the long-term nature of the costs and benefits of climate change that makes it difficult for governments to assess where their national interests lie.
“A multi-level environmental governance approach – where strong national strategies are coupled with increased cooperation among different actors within and across states as well as transnational policies – stands out as the most appropriate way to deal with such complex multi-dimensionality.“
This article claims that global environmental sustainability cannot be achieved without a more effective global governance on environmental matters, thus arguing for a reformed system that overcomes the limitations of the current fragmented framework of differentiated national environmental legislations. The first part of the article will provide an overview of the present global environmental governance by examining the Paris Agreement, which was concluded to strengthen states’ response to the environmental issue of climate change in the context of sustainable development. By drawing upon the concept of “soft reciprocity” – a condition in which leading states initiate climate policies which increase the level of ambition of other ones– and the claim that the main resources of international climate politics are political leadership and moral suasion,[7] the article will focus on the role that the EU, a leader in climate action, can play in spearheading global environmental governance. In the second part, the article will propose tools to be deployed to achieve such aims and assess the extent to which they can contribute to overcoming the present shortcomings of environmental governance.
Climate pledges under scrutiny: just ‘blah blah blah’[8]?
The Paris Agreement was adopted at the 21st UNFCCC summit in Paris (COP21) in 2015, with the aim of strengthening the global response to climate change in the context of sustainable development. As stated in Article 2, countries committed to ‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change’.[9]
Departing from the Kyoto Protocol, the 196 signatory parties included not only developed countries but also developing ones. Such a change was facilitated by a new and more flexible approach based on both binding and non-binding elements, with countries being free to decide how much to contribute to the collective mitigation effort according to a voluntary logic, with the only binding commitment being to report on their climate plans every five years.[10]
Nevertheless, this two-level game logic that encouraged states to sign the Agreement has also been regarded by many scholars as a considerable limitation, because of the great degree of freedom it left to the contracting parties, resulting in only a few of them delivering on the objectives set out in such an agreement. [11] Watson et al. analysed the climate pledges made by China, India, the United States, and the EU, the top four world emitters.[12] The commitments made by the EU emerged as the only ones fitting into the higher category of ‘sufficient’ – that is, in line with the goal to at least halve emissions by 2030, aiming for 40% or above emission reductions.
While the lack of sufficient pledges is a considerable shortcoming of the new approach introduced by the Paris Agreement, the EU represents an exception, as it has been delivering on its climate commitments through a large number of policies. The European Green Deal, presented by the European Commission in December 2019 and implemented through various tools including the Fit for 55% package,[13] was designed to achieve the ambitious goal of the EU becoming the first carbon-neutral continent by 2050. Drawing upon Watson’s conclusions and the assumption that climate policy choices have important spillover effects across jurisdictions,[14] it is evident that the EU’s advantage in the environmental field should be leveraged to initiate a ‘leader-laggard dynamic’,[15] where the former leads the way towards environmental sustainability and others follow. The question now arises as to which means best allow for this aim to be achieved in practice.
What path towards global environmental sustainability?
Two of the tools that help address problems arising from differentiated environmental legislation, while encouraging more uniform global environmental standards, are carbon border adjustment mechanisms and carbon pricing.
A Carbon Border Adjusted Mechanism (CBAM) – which involves adjusting the prices of imported goods according to the carbon output of their production process – entered into application in the EU in its transitional phase on October 1st, 2023. In the absence of uniform global environmental standards and binding targets, CBAM appears to be a successful tool across multiple levels. Firstly, it contributes to discouraging carbon leakage, the latter occurring when companies move their carbon-intensive production to jurisdictions with lower environmental standards. Indeed, the risk of this practice mainly concerns hard-to-abate sectors that face the highest costs from the price on carbon emissions. Secondly, it stimulates more sustainable production processes both in countries that have implemented such a mechanism and on a worldwide scale, while contributing to the wider discussion about the use of carbon pricing globally. Lastly, in the absence of the latter, CBAM allows, at least to some degree, to address competitiveness issues by enabling industries subject to carbon pricing to remain competitive with those that have weaker or no regulations to comply with.[16]
“By stimulating the kind of ‘soft reciprocity’ that the Paris Agreement aimed to trigger, states would be more and more discouraged from prioritising domestic concerns over global environmental ones and largely incentivised to pursue more ambitious environmental strategies.”
An Emission Trading System (ETS) is also currently operational in the EU. Following this example, carbon pricing should be introduced at a global level, coupled with the creation of a new agency to deal with environmental issues on a planetary scale. Indeed, having a common overarching institution in the form of a global environmental umbrella organisation would make a crucial difference in successfully achieving global climate goals. Despite no substantial change in this direction occurring until now, since the end of the 20th century, some states have been calling for a reform of UNEP as a remedy for its limited authority. For instance, the idea of creating a World Environmental Organization (WEO) has been the subject of debate for some time among scholars and climate experts, giving rise to conflicting ideas about its organisational structure and powers.[17] Palea, for instance, has advocated in favour of the creation of a WEO to be legally positioned above the states of the Conference of the Parties (COP). [18] It should be managed by a high-level independent authority following the example of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) during the process of European integration and operate under the control of the UN. Evidently, the WEO would allow to address one of the main challenges of current environmental governance, notably the lack of a global authority that can set rules and overcome states’ unwillingness to deliver on climate objectives.
Global carbon pricing and a WEO would also open the possibility of simultaneously achieving sustainable development and equity goals by implementing an equal per capita redistribution of the revenues raised from a carbon tax.[19] Indeed, some scholars and economists regard it as a measure that would allow for the protection of the most vulnerable segments of the population from the potential negative socio-economic impacts of the transition to a green economy. [20]
Altogether, such mechanisms would potentially result in increasing peer pressure and “naming and shaming” among states. By stimulating the kind of ‘soft reciprocity’ that the Paris Agreement aimed to trigger, states would be more and more discouraged from prioritising domestic concerns over global environmental ones and largely incentivised to pursue more ambitious environmental strategies.
Conclusion
This article has identified the main shortcomings of current global environmental governance and argued that consistent changes are needed to trigger sustainable low-carbon development pathways – a necessary step to attain global environmental sustainability. The EU has emerged as a key actor with a leading role in pursuing such a goal. The unique ambition of its environmental policies has been regarded as highly relevant in setting standards and examples for other countries and, ultimately, initiating a cascade dynamic in which it becomes more appealing for states and their economies to devote efforts and resources to accelerating the transition to a greener future. In practice, the use of a carbon border adjustment mechanism and a global carbon pricing, as well as the creation of an independent authority to ensure a higher degree of coordination at a global level on climate change and other environmental matters, are identified as tools capable of enabling progress towards such an objective. Clearly, there are other mechanisms with significant potential for fostering governments’ compliance with climate targets that have not been analysed in this article. These include, for instance, strengthening legal avenues to hold states accountable for their actions and inactions through litigation mechanisms. In this regard, the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland is highly significant and establishes a key precedent.[21] It is undeniable that the challenges arising from the implementation of all these instruments are considerable. The question remains open as to whether EU’s leadership role, combined with the disadvantages of lagging behind in the green transition and the benefits of a coordinated and thus more efficient response to environmental issues, will finally encourage states to reform the global environmental governance system in the direction required to achieve global environmental sustainability.
References
[1] United Nations (2023). Synergy Solutions for A World In Crisis: Tackling Climate And SDG Action Together. Report on Strengthening the evidence base. First edition 2023.
[2] Saurin cited in Elliott, L. (2004). “The Global Politics of the Environment”. In L. Elliott (eds.) The Global Politics of the Environment, Palgrave.
[3] Beck, U. (2006). “Living in the world risk society”. Economy and Society, 35 (3), pp. 329-245.
[4] UNFCCC (2023). “New Analysis of National Climate Plans: Insufficient Progress Made, COP28 Must Set Stage for Immediate Action”. United Nations Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/news/new-analysis of-national-climate-plans-insufficient-progress-made-cop28-must-set-stage-for-immediate
[5] Fraundorfer, M. (2022). “Global Environmental Governance”. In Global Governance in the Age of the Anthropocene, Palgrave Macmillan.
[6] Falkner, R. (2016). “The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics”. International Affairs, 92 (5), pp. 1107-25.
[7] Ibid.
[8] This expression was used by Greta Thunberg in a speech at the Youth4Climate summit that took place in Milan on 28 – 30 September 2021, to denounce the inaction of global leaders towards addressing the climate emergency. For more information, please refer to: Thunberg, Greta. “’Blah, blah, blah’: Greta Thunberg lambasts leaders over climate crisis”. The Guardian, September 28, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/sep/28/blah-greta-thunberg leaders-climate-crisis-co2-emissions
[9] UNFCCC (2015). Paris Agreement.
[10] Falkner, R. (2016). “The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics”. International Affairs, 92 (5), pp. 1107-25.
[11] Dauvergne, P. (2017). “The Coming Crisis of Planetary Instability”. In C. Hay & T. Hunt (eds.) The Coming Crisis, Palgrave Macmillan.
[12] Watson, R. et al. (2019). “The Truth Behind the Climate Pledges, FEU-US.
[13] For more information, please see: European Parliamentary Research Service (2024). Fit for 55 Package. Towards Climate Neutrality [Report]. European Parliament.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733513/EPRS_BRI(2022)733513_EN.pdf
[14] Bown et al. (2023). “How trade cooperation by the United States, the European Union, and China can fight climate change”. Working Papers 23-8.
[15] Bulmer et al. (2005). “Policy Transfer in the European Union: An Institutionalist Perspective”. British Journal of Political Science, 35 (1), pp. 103–26.
[16] Bown et al. (2023). “How trade cooperation by the United States, the European Union, and China can fight climate change”. Working Papers 23-8.
[17] Charnovitz, S. (2005). “A World Environment Organization”. In Bradnee Chambers W. et al. (eds.) Reforming international environmental governance: From institutional limits to innovative reforms, United National University Press.
[18] Palea, R. (2023). “COP27: from Bad to Worse; the Strength to Deal with the Threats”, The Federalist Debate, Centro Studi sul Federalismo. Year XXXVI, 1, https://www.federalist-debate.org/archive/year-xxxvi number-1-march-2023/comments/cop27-from-bad-to-worse-the-strength-to-deal-with-the-threats
[19] Budolfson et al. (2021). “Protecting the poor with a carbon tax and equal per capita dividend”. Nature Climate Change, 11, pp. 1025–1026 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01228-x
[20] See, for instance, the statement of the Climate Leadership Council (2021). Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends, https://clcouncil.org/economists-statement/
[21] Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland. App no. no. 53600/20. (ECtHR, 9 April 2024)