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Guest Author: Hannah Preuss
Hannah’s academic interest centres on the EU’s role in international relations, particularly vis-à-vis China. After a Sino-German bachelor’s in International Economics, she completed the dual Master “Europe and Asia in Global Affairs” at Sciences Po Paris and Fudan University in Shanghai. She gained practical experience through internships at the German Foreign Ministry in Taiwan, GIZ, the German Chamber of Commerce, the Permanent Representation of Germany to the European Union (EU), and the European Commission. At the time of the first publishing of this article on the YJEA’s blog, Hannah is working as a trainee at the European Commission – DG TRADE. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ personal views and should not be attributed to the European Commission.
Introduction
With von der Leyen’s ‘Geopolitical‘ Commission assuming office in 2019, the EU aims to enhance its global position. To this end, the EU focuses on Strategic Autonomy, meaning the EU’s capacity to act without being dependent on other nations. So, did the Geopolitical Commission push for a joint EU strategy towards the Indo-Pacific, the EUs main economic partner and (future) geopolitical hub. When “The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” was published on 16 September 2021, Chinese scholars had reached a consensus about the negative perception of the US-led concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’ intended to contain China.[i] The EU, however, highlights its Strategic Autonomy: its Indo-Pacific Strategy is not to be understood as a US alignment but rather an individual effort to reach out to the area. The major difference between the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the US one is its inclusivity: “The EU’s approach to the region is one of cooperation not confrontation. […] The EU will also pursue its multifaceted engagement with China […] and encourages China to play its part in a peaceful and thriving Indo-Pacific region.” [ii] But how is the EU’s approach focused on Strategic Autonomy being perceived in China? Do Chinese scholars assess the EU’s strategy as a US alignment or as an outreach for cooperation?
A narrative battle: Why is the ‘Indo-Pacific’ so controversial?
Firstly, it is important to reflect on the wording ‘Indo-Pacific’ and its political connotations. At the beginning of the 21st century, the term Indo-Pacific was rare, and the area has most frequently been referred to as Asia Pacific. During the last two decades, western (especially US and Japanese) narratives pushed to replace the term Asia Pacific with Indo-Pacific. So, does the term “Indo-Pacific” itself embody a Sino-American narrative battle over influence in the area?
The origins of the term Indo-Pacific can be traced back to the 1920s -1930s in the German Weimar Republic, especially in Haushofer’s studies on Geopolitik. It re-emerged at the beginning of this century with the Japanese prime minister’s 2007 speech at the Indian Parliament integrating the Indian and Pacific Ocean “Confluence of the Two Seas” or his 2016 address “Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. Subsequently, the US took on and further pushed this wording, for instance, by renaming its “Pacific Command” the “Indo-Pacific Command”.[iii] Throughout the last decade, not only Japan and the US but also Australia, India, ASEAN, New Zealand, and the UK adopted the wording Indo-Pacific, at least to some extent. Seemingly aligned, these strategies vary considerably regarding geographic extension, policy priorities, emphasis on bilateral or multilateral approaches, or the inclusion of China. The ASEAN approach, for instance, can be interpreted as rather inclusive, while the US focuses on keeping its power position in the region.[iv]
The Chinese reaction to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept
China views the Indo-Pacific concept critically, especially the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific is perceived as a measure to contain China and as an attempt at anti-China coalition building. Also, the implicit focus on India, China’s enemy nation, poses a concern. Thus, China usually refers to the area as Asia- not Indo-Pacific.[v]
Chinese scholars’ attention to the Indo-Pacific concept has risen since 2013. Initially, publications were limited. In 2017 and 2018, the number of published articles increased heavily. Early-stage Chinese papers on the Indo-Pacific are marked by ambiguity both regarding the geographical scope and content of the Indo-Pacific concept.[vi] Still, there seems to be consensus that the Indo-Pacific concept is a means to balance China, with scholars agreeing that India is key to the US strategic conception.[vii] Along with a shift from Obama’s Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy to Trump’s focus on containing China, Chinese assessment started to adopt a more critical stance, portraying the Indo-Pacific concept as a threat. This comes with concerns about India trying to become a world power. According to Chinese scholars, the US is trying to pull India up against China. Since late 2019, most Chinese scholars have argued that the Indo-Pacific strategy is a concept led and dominated by the US with the purpose of containing China. Scholars view India’s siding with the US as threatening peace in the region and against India’s tradition of non-alignment. This leads Long (2019) to conclude that India benefits from the Sino-US rivalry in the area.[viii] Since the outbreak of COVID-19 and the reemergence of Sino-Indian border frictions in 2020, Chinese scholars perceive India’s role in the Indo-Pacific as increasingly confrontational.[ix]
The official Chinese stance and scholarly publications on the concept of Indo-Pacific are relatively consistent. Initially, official responses were rare, then gradually shifted from ambiguous optimistic assessments to public opposition criticising its (perceived) intention to contain China.[x] From 2013 to 2017, policy advice focused on vigilant but overall positive and cooperative responses. In 2017 and 2018, there have been both optimistic and pessimistic views. Official responses opposed using the Indo-Pacific strategy as a tool to contain China, simultaneously, more optimistic responses can be found, such as the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stating that the Indo-Pacific is a new topic involving regional cooperation.[xi] Later, in 2020, officials emphasised the negative impact of the Indo-Pacific strategy on the regional order, criticising it as an Indo-Pacific version of NATO. The official position denounces the US using the Indo-Pacific concept to divide China and other regional countries, e.g. regarding South China Sea issues. Overall, Chinese discourse emphasises that although there are various versions of Indo-Pacific strategies, the main driver of the concept is the US trying to contain China.[xii]
The Indo-Pacific concept within the EU
Except for France, with its overseas territories in the region, few European countries have focused on the area at the beginning of this century. This changed with the economic rise of Asia and extensive trade relations. China has taken over the US position as the EU’s main trading partner in goods since 2020.[xiii] Given its regional presence, France has been the first EU country to publish an Indo-Pacific strategy in 2019, later updated in 2021. Germany and the Netherlands followed in September and November 2020 with the German Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific and the Dutch non-paper Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia. It might have been the ASEAN’s inclusive framing of the Indo-Pacific concept which decreased German and Dutch hesitation about adopting the Indo-Pacific wording. It is noteworthy that both the German and Dutch publications are to be understood as contributions to developing a joint EU position towards the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, it has been a non-paper on the Indo-Pacific prepared by France, Germany, and the Netherlands, which initiated discussions on an EU Indo-Pacific strategy in the fall of 2020. The first discussion took place on December 8, 2020, in the Council Working Group on Asia-Oceania (COASI), where it continued to be discussed until its publication on 16 September 2021.[xiv]
“The EU’s core objectives are to strengthen its role in the area and, most importantly, prevent conflict which would endanger its basic supply and economic stability.“
While France, as a resident power, has various interests in security, trade, and power, German and Dutch motivations are rather related to their interest as big trading nations looking for market access and open sea lanes. While Germany and the Netherlands seem to adopt a narrower interpretation of the Indo-Pacific “from Pakistan to the islands of the Pacific”,[xv] France and the EU, additionally include Africa’s East coast. This broad geographical definition covers French interests more adequately than the wording Asia-Pacific, which might have contributed to French affinity in pushing for a broader EU definition.[xvi]
All three national strategies portray the Indo-Pacific as the “economic centre of gravity in the world, where the major strategic competition between the US and China is playing out and where the future of the international order is likely to be decided”.[xvii] All national strategies share the assessment of the Indo-Pacific as a pivotal point for future global developments and, hence, its importance for the EU. In contrast to the US, the European approach to the Indo-Pacific is inclusive and does not adopt US-style ‘free and open’ rhetoric. According to Wacker, the European approaches are thus the closest to the ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, published in June 2019.[xviii] While the US is only briefly touched upon as a traditional EU ally and power in the Indo-Pacific region, all papers focus on Sino-US rivalry as a significant concern for the EU. China is mainly portrayed as an important trading partner and security actor. The EU’s narrative reiterates offers for cooperation not only regarding trade but also climate change or biodiversity. European-style normative expectations for China to take on responsibility for ensuring peace and stability (South China Sea issues, free shipping routes) in the region and issues such as Human Rights or the Rule of Law can be deducted. The EU’s core objectives are to strengthen its role in the area and, most importantly, prevent conflict which would endanger its basic supply and economic stability. This shall be achieved by strengthening partnerships, including with China. Simultaneously, in line with EU Strategic Autonomy, dependency both economically on China and security-wise on the US shall be reduced.
So, how is the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy being perceived in China?
The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy was published when the Chinese assessment had reached a low, identifying the concept as a countermeasure. Despite few references to the US in European Indo-Pacific visions, they come at a time when Chinese consensus on the Indo-Pacific concept as US-led anti-China coalition building had been consolidated. To capture the Chinese perception of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, I analysed reactive discourse published by Chinese scholars. Relevant Chinese publications have been determined by a keyword search for “Indo-Pacific strategy” (印太战略) and “European Union” (欧盟) on the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) platform, the ‘Chinese version of Google Scholar’. As the biggest academic publishing platform for journals, conference notes, or newspaper articles, CNKI serves the purpose of capturing contemporary Chinese opinion.[xix]
Based on the CNKI keyword search, the first Chinese reaction to the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy was published in March 2020, meaning the year before the publication of “The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” in September 2021. At that time, Ge (2020) assessed the EU’s Indo-Pacific concept as an attempt to become a stakeholder in the region by promoting free trade and security issues as well as a balancing act between Sino-US rivalry.[xx] When the EU published its Indo-Pacific Strategy paper in 2021, there were four Chinese publications on the topic, six in 2022 and again four in 2023. Based on a discourse analysis, four recurring arguments can be found in Chinese publications. Chinese discourse portrays the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy as 1) a mismatch between EU intentions and capabilities, 2) a tool furthering EU integration, 3) an EU attempt for a place in a geopolitical hub, and 4) (less assertive) US alignment.
Firstly, some scholars argue that the EU’s strategy is an idealistic solution where ambition outweighs capabilities.[xxi] Strategic autonomy is being questioned, especially regarding security issues where the EU heavily relies on US support. Besides, slow inter-EU decision-making regarding Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) requiring unanimity limits joint EU positioning.
Second, the Indo-Pacific strategy is perceived as a tool for furthering EU integration by consolidating European foreign policies. Especially following Brexit and the rise of Eurosceptic movements, a push for European integration is much needed.[xxii]
Third, Zhao and Fu (2022)[xxiii] and Wang and Zhang (2022)[xxiv] posit the purpose of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is to advance political and economic interests and to get involved in Indo-Pacific affairs. Zheng and Wang (2023)[xxv] have identified a novel EU foreign policy approach which consists of advancing inter-regionalism to promote the EU’s position in the Indo-Pacific.
“Chinese discourse portrays the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy as 1) a mismatch between EU intentions and capabilities, 2) a tool furthering EU integration, 3) an EU attempt for a place in a geopolitical hub, and 4) (less assertive) US alignment.”
Fourth, the main differences in scholarly assessment can be found regarding the level of US alignment within the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy. While some authors argue that the EU’s strategy follows the US example of containing China, others emphasise how the EU balances Sino-US rivalry and suggest furthering Sino-EU cooperation. Adopting a rather US-leaning perception, Jian emphasises that the EU strategies’ “fundamental purpose is to balance China’s economic and political influence in the Indo-Pacific”, whose publication is potentially encouraged by the US. Still, he nuances that the “EU’s approach is less confrontational towards China than the US one,” Especially mentions of Taiwan and the South China Sea alarm his critical assessment.[xxvi] Zhang (2023), on the other hand, views the strategy as an EU autonomy measure, positing that the “purpose of the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy is to surpass competition between China and the US and to attach importance to cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners […]. Its ultimate goal is to maintain a central position in the world economy and science and technology.“[xxvii]
Conclusion
Overall, the EU’s narrative on the Indo-Pacific tries to balance Sino-US rivalry by blurring the US confrontational approach towards the area. European approaches focus on multilateralism; they strongly discourage a uni- or bilateral world order. This is because the EU, as a middle power, aims for a rules- rather than a power-based international order, see for instance Joseph Borrell’s post advocating for an ‘open and rules-based’ regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific.[xxviii] While Chinese reactions seem to attribute other domestic issues to the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy (limited EU capabilities, furthering EU integration, enhancing the EU’s geopolitical position), the EU’s balancing attempt is understood to various degrees by different scholars.
The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy could serve as a pacifying tool in an increasingly bipolar area. It could help prevent block building in the context of Sino-US rivalry, which would decrease tensions in the area. To this end, European officials may continue or further their balancing approach by suggesting Sino-European cooperation, for instance, regarding climate change. The official narrative shall focus on stability in the region as a middle power that does not want to choose sides. China may try to break the US-led exclusivity of the Indo-Pacific concept by siding with the EU for stability in the region. To this end, Chinese officials may focus on encouraging EU Strategic Autonomy when seeking cooperation.
With the upcoming US elections, a shift in the US stance towards the Indo-Pacific needs to be observed. It might affect power battles in the area and the future of the EU’s Strategic Autonomy leverage.
References:
[i] Li, L., & Jiang, T. (2023). From Conceptual Idea to Strategic Reality: ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from the Perspective of Chinese Scholars. Asian Perspective 47(1), 101-119. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0004.
[ii] European Commission. (2021). Questions and Answers: EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_4709.
[iii] Li, H. (2022). The “Indo-Pacific”: Intellectual Origins and International Visions in Global Contexts. Modern Intellectual History, 19(3), 807-833. doi:10.1017/S1479244321000214.
[iv] Heiduk, F., & Wacker, G. (2020). From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. Significance, Implementation, and Challenges. Siftung für Wissenschaft und Politik, 9. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ research_papers/2020RP09_IndoPacific.pdf. p.30.
[v] Li, L., & Jiang, T. (2023). From Conceptual Idea to Strategic Reality: ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from the Perspective of Chinese Scholars. Asian Perspective 47(1), 101-119. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0004.
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] Liu, Z. (2014). Conflict or Cooperation: Geopolitics and Geo-economics in the Indo-Pacific. Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review (7), 4–21.
[viii] Long, X. (2019). The US ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and India’s Considerations. Frontiers (8), 68–75.
[ix] Lou, C. (2020). The Changes of India’s China Policy and China’s Response. Contemporary International Relations (11), 26–34.
[x] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2018). Transcript of Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng’s Exclusive Interview with the Financial Times. www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zyjh_674906/201809/t20180926_9870282.shtml.
[xi] State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (2019). Wang Yi’s Views on the Indo-Pacific Concept. www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2019-07/31/content_5417701.htm.
[xii] Li, L., & Jiang, T. (2023). From Conceptual Idea to Strategic Reality: ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from the Perspective of Chinese Scholars. Asian Perspective 47(1), 101-119. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0004.
[xiii] European Parliament. (2023). The European Union and its Trade Partners. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/erpl-app-public/factsheets/pdf/en/FTU_5.2.1.pdf. p.3.
[xiv] Wacker, G. (2021). The Indo-Pacific concepts of France, Germany and the Netherlands in comparison : implications and challenges for the EU. European University Institute, Global Governance Programme, EU-Asia Project. https://hdl.handle.net/1814/71354.
[xv] Government of the Netherlands. (2020). Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia. https://www.government.nl/documents/publications/2020/11/13/indo-pacific-guidelines. p.2.
[xvi] European Commission. (2021). The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021JC0024. p.1.
[xvii] Government of the Netherlands. (2020). Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia. https://www.government.nl/documents/publications/2020/11/13/indo-pacific-guidelines. p.2.
[xviii] Wacker, G. (2021). The Indo-Pacific concepts of France, Germany and the Netherlands in comparison : implications and challenges for the EU. European University Institute, Global Governance Programme, EU-Asia Project. https://hdl.handle.net/1814/71354.
[xix] China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). (n.d.). CNKI介绍. https://www.cnki.net/.
[xx] 葛建华. (2020). 欧盟战略自主与欧版“印太战略”. (Ge J. (2020). EU Strategic Autonomy and the European Version of the Indo-Pacific Strategy)
[xxi] See for instance 简军波. (n.d.). 欧洲形势专家笔谈：欧盟的印太战略评估. Institute of European Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. http://ies.cass.cn/cn/work/comment/202109/t20210917_5361353.shtml. (Jian J. (n.d.). EU Expert Pannel: The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategic Assessment.)
汪金国 & 张立辉. (2022). 欧盟加速推动“印太战略”及其影响. (Wang, J. & Zhang, L.. (2022). The European Union’s Accelerated Promotion of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications.)
郑春荣 & 王晓彤. (2023). 地区间主义视角下欧盟印太战略的 功能目标及其限度. (Zheng, C. & Wang, X. (2023). The Functional Objectives and Limits of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy from the Perspective of Interregionalism.)
[xxii] 韩卓希. (2021). 欧盟的印太战略：被动的“战略自主”. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_12435698. (Han, Z. (2021). The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Passive “Strategic Autonomy”.)
[xxiii] 赵宁宁 & 付文慧. (2022). 欧盟“印太战略”的 生成逻辑、战略内涵 与影响研判. (Zhao, N. & Fu, W. (2022). The Logic, Strategic Connotation and Implications of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.)
[xxiv] 汪金国 & 张立辉. (2022). 欧盟加速推动“印太战略”及其影响. (Wang, J. & Zhang, L.. (2022). The European Union’s Accelerated Promotion of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications.)
[xxv] 郑春荣 & 王晓彤. (2023). 地区间主义视角下欧盟印太战略的 功能目标及其限度. (Zheng, C. & Wang, X. (2023). The Functional Objectives and Limits of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy from the Perspective of Interregionalism.)
[xxvi] 简军波. (n.d.). 欧洲形势专家笔谈：欧盟的印太战略评估. Institute of European Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. http://ies.cass.cn/cn/work/comment/202109/t20210917_5361353.shtml. (Jian J. (n.d.). EU Expert Pannel: The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategic Assessment.)
[xxvii] 张许许. (2023). 欧盟的印太战略及对中国的启示. (Zhang, X. (2023). The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Implications for China.)
[xxviii] Borell, J. (2021). The EU needs a strategic approach for the Indo-Pacific. European External Action Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/94898/eu-needs-strategic-approach-indo-pacific_en.